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Abstract: Courts and Legislative bodies in Europe have to deal very 
frequently with the delicate task of defining the notion of religion for legal 
purposes, since this term is involved in all kind of legal sectors related to 
freedom of religion and to legal relationships between the State and 
religious groups. We often hear about legal disputes concerning new 
religious movements which demand to be recognized as a religion by the 
law.  In this presentation the author analyzes different systems for defining 
religion in the Law. 
 
Brief Information on the author: Rafael Palomino is Professor of Law at 
Universidad Complutense de Madrid (Spain), Research Professor of the 
Human Rights Institute of Universidad Complutense de Madrid, member of 
the Advisory Council of the ODHIR Panel of Experts on Freedom of 
Religion or Belief (OSCE). Associate member of the Royal Academy of 
Law (Spain). Vice-Director of “Anuario de Derecho Eclesiástico del 
Estado” [Church-State Law Spanish Yearbook] & member of the Editorial 
Board of the “Revista General de Derecho Canónico y Derecho 
Eclesiástico del Estado” [Church-State & Canon Law Review]. He is 
author, among others, of Las Objeciones de Conciencia: Conflictos entre 
Conciencia y Ley en el Derecho Norteamericano (1994) on Conflicts 
between Religious Conscience and the Law in the United States of 
America, Derecho a la Intimidad y Religión: La Protección Jurídica del 
Secreto Religioso (1999) on Religious Privileged Communications in 
Comparative Law, Estado y Religión: Textos para una Reflexión Crítica 
(2000) on Church-State Relationships History, Derecho Comparado y 
Religión (2007) on the concept of religion in Comparative law. Main 
research fields include religious freedom, comparative law, civil rights, 
conscientious objection, church-state legal affairs in the Middle East, 









There is concern in many legal systems over the meaning of the term 
“religion” which the law contains. This concern is manifested in those 
borderline cases in which new religious movements come to the law 
seeking legal recognition as religious communities or groups. It is also 
apparent in cases in which a group or association seeks a legal status (a tax-
exempt status) which is specifically confined to religious institutions in 
particular or to non-profit organizations in general.  
 
In recent times many States have enacted special laws to bestow or 
recognized the legal personality of religious groups in countries with a 
strong tradition attached to a certain religious denomination or in countries 
in which religious freedom has been recognized very recently. Usually, 
these special laws make explicit or implicit references to conditions to gain 
the status of religious community, which are not specifically linked to a 
religion, but to other issues, such as time of implementation, number of 
members, statutes or regulations content, etc.1
 
An important sector of the academy feels that according to the very nature 
of religious freedom it is unlawful to craft any kind of definition or concept 
of religion. According to this trend the law has nothing to do with religion 
and its only task is to protect religious freedom. Any person or any group 
who assert any kind of injure on religious freedom grounds deserves 
protection or at least attention. The question then is not if the group or the 
individual is religious, but the factual aspects of the specific case, under 
which the law affords protection to the individual.  
 
Being that true, to other scholars the question still remains. Although the 
State has neither the skills nor the competence to define what is religion for 
legal purposes, it is clear that the word “religion” or the word “beliefs” 
appear in legal text and probably would be necessary to proceed with this 
concept the same way as with any other word of the same category, like 
“art,” “culture,” “sport,” “literature” and so forth. 
 
In this presentation I shall sketch the basic reasons according to which the 
term religion is relevant to the law and to sketch different tendencies to 
formulate the concept of religion in the law. 
 
                                                 
1 See Case of the Moscow Branch of the Salvation Army v. Russia (Application 
no. 72881/01); Case of Church of Scientology Moscow v. Russia (Application no. 
18147/02).  
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2. Why the concept of religion matters? 
 
There are at least three different ways to answer this question affirmatively. 
Each of them is grounded in practical, not theoretical, issues. 
 
2.1. Social activity and religion. 
 
The first point deals with the distinction made between different segments 
of activity in civil society before the law. Among others, these segments 
are financial enterprises, non-profit sector, culture and arts, the beliefs and 
religious sector. Each of them might be combined with another one, but at 
the same time it seems to be clear that each of them has its own consistency 
and merits attention by and to itself. That is why, for instance, welfare state 
promotes and protects indigenous arts and culture, regulates as a special 
sector sports played by citizens or endorse the improvement of the 
industrial tissue of the country.  
 
In the case of religion, the state of affairs is somewhat different. Since 
democratic states recognize religious freedom and some sort of separation 
of Church and State, governments avoid the identification or entanglement 
with religion in different degrees. And at the same time, when religion 
enters into contact with other segments of activity (religion with politics or 
religion with economics) probably the Law will react in a strong way to 
return each activity to their own sector. This is the case of the religious 
association Kalifatstaat in Germany, in the year 2003, which was decided 
by the German Constitutional Court2. A similar case was decided by the 
European Court of Human Rights in Refah Partisi v. Turkey3. It is true that 
in both the cases it is important to take into account other issue, namely the 
danger posed to democracy by a political vision of Islam. But the subtle 
message of separating politics from religion, at least in an explicit way, still 
remains. And it is even clearer in those cases in which economics and 
                                                 
2 A. SEGLERS GÓMEZ-QUINTERO (con la colaboración de J.M. MARTINELL), La 
laicidad y sus matices, Comares, Granada (2005), pp. 65-67. 
3 Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey - 
41340/98;41342/98;41343/98;... [2003] ECHR 87 (13 February 2003), n. 30. 
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religion interact in the same community or group, as in Germany4, Italy5 or 
France6.   
 
2.2. Religion mentioned in legal texts. 
 
In connection with the first point explained above, the constitutional and 
fundamental texts of many countries make explicit reference or take into 
consideration religion in order to maintain some kind of special 
relationship. This explicit mention of religion could be seen clearly in the 
Constitution of Poland, article 25 § (3) The relationship between the State 
and churches and other religious organizations shall be based on the 
principle of respect for their autonomy and the mutual independence of 
each in its own sphere, as well as on the principle of cooperation for the 
individual and the common good7.  It is also the case in the Spanish 
Constitution, article 16 § 3 No religion shall have a state character. The 
public powers shall take into account the religious beliefs of Spanish 
society and maintain the appropriate relations of cooperation, with the 
Catholic Church and other denominations. With different wording, this is 
also the case of the Italian Constitution of 1947 which points out in article 
8: The relations with the State are regulated by law on the basis of 
agreements with their respective representatives. Or other example, the 
case of Germany in the Weimar Constitution article 137 annexed8.  
                                                 
4 F. MESSNER, «Peut-on définir juridiquement la religion? L´exemple de la 
Republique Fédérale d´Allemagne», L´année canonique, vol. 31 (1988), pp. 336-342. 
5 Among others, M. FORMICA, «L'art. 416 c.p. e le confessioni religiose: un 
commento all'epilogo del "caso Scientology" (Nota a App. Milano 5 ottobre 2000)», Il 
Foro Italiano, 126 (12) 2001, p. 644-3450; R. SARACINO, «Scientology tra libertà 
religiosa e diritto comune», Il Diritto Eclesiastico, n. 2 (2001), p. 112.   
6 F. ONIDA, «Nuove problematiche religiose per gli ordinamenti laici 
contemporanei: il caso Scientology», Quaderni di Diritto e Politica Eclesiastica, 
1997/3, pp. 992-993. 
7 The text of this Constitution and of the Constitutions mentioned above are 
compiled in A.M. VEGA GUTIÉRREZ (coord.), Religión y libertades fundamentales en los 
países de Naciones Unidas: textos constitucionales, Comares, Granada (2003).  
8 Article 137. (Weimar Constitution). 1.There is no state church. 
2. Freedom of association is guaranteed to religious bodies. There are no 
restrictions as to the union of religious bodies within the territory of the Federation. 
3. Each religious body regulates and administers its affairs independently within 
the limits of general laws. It appoints its officials without the cooperation of the Land, 
or of the civil community. 
4. Religious bodies acquire legal rights in accordance with the general 
regulations of the civil code. 
5. Religious bodies remain corporations with public rights in so far as they have 
been so up to the present. Equal rights shall be granted to other religious bodies upon 
application, if their constitution and the number of their members offer a guarantee of 
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 In other cases, religion (sometimes coupled with the term belief) 
appears in the constitutional texts qualifying a specific freedom: freedom of 
religion. This is the case, for instance, of the Slovak Republic in article 24 
of the Constitution of 1992: The freedoms of thought, conscience, religion, 
and faith are guaranteed. This right also comprises the possibility to 
change one’s religion, belief or faith. Everyone has the right to be without 
religious belief. Everyone has the right to publicly express his opinion. 
  Hence, in many cases the law has to explore the meaning of religion, 
what is belief or faith, in narrow or broad terms, for citizens or persons as 
individuals or for groups and communities. This could be relevant, for 
instance, in order to determine whether some grounds for discrimination 
are accomplished or even if there are factual basis for asylum-case 
adjudication9. 
 In those cases in which the States enter into agreements with 
religious communities or groups, this same fact conveys some sort of 
implicit recognition of the community or group. This is the apparent case of 
Italy. In other situations, several conditions are required for enter into an 
agreement, specially the requisite of registration in a Registry specially 
designed for religious entities or groups. And this is in part the case of 
Spain.  
The complex and diverse structure of Church-State agreements 
(whether concordats, agreements, agreed statutes, etc) generates different 
models for recognizing religion which subtly convey a concept or ‘notion’ 
of religion hidden in the sub-consciousness of the people of a given country 
or in the minds of the public authorities. 
 
2.3. “Special or specific law” devoted to religion or belief. 
 
Finally, I would like to stress a common trend in Europe concerning 
the model of religion-State relationship. This suggestion is not mine: it 
comes from the studies of scholars convening the different legal structures 
in countries of Western Europe and it is something that I think we could 
even assert of some countries of Eastern Europe as well.  
                                                                                                                                               
permanency. When several such religious bodies holding public rights combine to form 
one union this union becomes a corporation of a similar class. 
6. Religious bodies forming corporations with public rights are entitled to levy 
taxes on the basis of the civil tax rolls, in accordance with the provisions of Land law. 
7. Associations adopting as their work the common encouragement of a world-
philosophy shall be placed upon an equal footing with religious bodies. 
8. So far as the execution of these provisions may require further regulation, this 
is the duty of the Land legislature. 
9 See T. J. GUNN, “The Complexity of Religion and the Definition of ‘Religion’ 
in International Law”, Harvard Human Rights Journal, vol. 16 (2003), 189-215.  
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«In Western Europe there is a common model of relationship 
between the state and religious faiths. It is frequently summarized in the 
French phrase la laicité de l’Etat (secularity of the State) (Robert 1988, 
409ff.) but this model is also applicable to countries where a national 
Church or State Church exists. 
«This common European model appears to be defined by the 
following coordinates: 
a) The state is neutral (impartial) towards the various individual 
religious subjects. 
b) A religious sub-sector is singled out within the public sector. This 
may be understood as a “playing field” or “protected area.” Inside it the 
various collective religious subjects (churches, denominations and religious 
communities) are free to act in conditions of substantial advantage 
compared to those collective subjects that are not religious. 
c) The state has the right to intervene in this area only to see that the 
players respect the rules of the game and the boundaries of the playing 
field»10. 
What I want to underline from this quotation is precisely that “sub-
sector” that the State singles out. It is what in Spain and in other countries 
is identified as “special law” as opposed to “common or general law.” 
Special law by itself does not comprise discrimination; it is only a specific 
regulation for an area, which focuses on specific characteristics of a social 
phenomenon which deserves attention. It is clear to me that “special or 
specific law” for religion in the communal dimension is not necessary in all 
the cases. It is possible to regulate the communal dimension of religion 
with general legal instruments (we have many examples of religious groups 
assimilated to corporations, associations, etc. regulated the same way as 
other groups established for social different purposes, like sports, culture, 
literature, etc). But special law is apt to meet the needs of religious freedom 
in a efficient way, i.e. offering the religious groups the legal space 
necessary to develop the very core of the activities which religious freedom 
protects. 
So, if in many countries of Europe there is a sub-sector legally 
developed for a group of communities of religious nature, the problem 
turns then to determine the “key element” which makes possible for groups 
to enter in that sub-sector. That key element precisely is “to be religious in 
nature”, and this requirement has to be developed in some way, clarifying 
under which characteristics and under which elements a group is to be 
considered religious.  
 
                                                 
10 S. FERRARI, “The New Wine and the Old Cask. Tolerance, Religion and the 
Law in Contemporary Europe”, Ratio Iuris, vol. 10, n. 1 (1997), pp. 77-78. 
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3. Different devices and mechanisms to incorporate a notion of religion in 
the law. 
 
 This issue is interconnected with many aspects of the law of each 
country which could be explored.  Topics like the sources of the law related 
to Church-State relations, the constitutional framework which characterizes 
those relations, the number of religious denominations and groups, the 
legal system tradition (i.e. anglo-american or continental legal tradition), 
the specific wording of the constitutional provisions regarding religious 
freedom, etc. are constantly shaping the features of the practical and 
theoretical notion of religion in a given country. 
 However, it is possible to devise different trends concerning the 
notion of religion in the law in some sort of classification. Needless to say, 
the following classification describes “pure” models or trends.  
 
3.1. Auto-referential systems. 
 
 In part, auto-referential systems constitute a scholar request in order 
to preserve the very meaning of the constitutionally recognized religious 
freedom11.  
The assumption is clear: the State has no power to determine or 
define what religion is, since public authorities in a modern democratic 
system have only the role of protecting and recognizing a freedom related 
to it. There would be nothing more dangerous than public agencies altering 
the meaning of crucial concepts for protecting rights and freedom. 
Consider, for instance, the possibility of public agencies narrowing the 
concepts of race, speech, or torture, or widening the concept of 
misdemeanour or public order. By the same token, a new and unknown 
religious group with special characteristics would find almost impossible 
any kind of recognition if public authorities have a vast power to set the 
definition of religion. In other words, the State is totally unskilled to define 
what is and what is not religion. Not only because religion goes far beyond 
the goals of the State, bur also because State agents are not well-equipped 
to manage this issues. 
                                                 
11 See, for instance, A. BOWSER, «Delimiting Religion in the Constitution: A 
Classification Problem», Valparaiso University Law Review, vol. 11 (1977), pp. 163-
226. A. MOTILLA, «Aproximación a la categoría de confesión religiosa en el Derecho 
español» Il Diritto Eclesiastico,  1/1989, pp. 145-191, F. ONIDA, «Las relaciones entre 
el Estado y las confesiones minoritarias: los derechos religiosos de los inmigrantes», 
Anuario de Derecho Eclesiástico del Estado, vol. XIV (1998), pp. 90-111. J. WEISS, 
«Privilege, Posture and Protection ‘Religion’ in the Law», Yale Law Journal, vol. 73 
(1964), pp. 593-623. 
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 According to this trend, there is no “definition” of religion at all. The 
only possible thing to do is to trust the individual or the group when they 
assert that they are religious in nature. If individuals or groups assert a 
claim on religious freedom grounds, then the State must rely on that 
assertion.  
 The only limit to this auto-referential trend could be those fields of 
activity alien to religion in the cognitive level. This means that the State 
could determine that something is not religion in itself because its doctrines 
or system of beliefs belong to the scientific realm or even to the economic 
sphere. The task of the public agencies —which is not exempt of 
difficulty— is then to ascertain whether the individual or the group who 
alleges a religious claim does not invade the field of other societal 
activities, like politics, finance or medical issues. 
 The auto-referential system seems to be the foundation in the 
German decision in the case Landgerericht Hamburg recognizing the 
Scientology Kirche Celebrity Center right to register in the association 
registry of a religious group which sustains its religious nature12. The auto-
refential system is in part the foundation of the 2001 Spanish Constitutional 
Court decision concerning the registration of the Unification Church of the 
Reverend Moon in the Registry of Religious Entities. The Spanish Court 
pointed out that it is not the affair of the State to judge or asses the religious 
constituent of a given group which request to be recorded in the Register of 
Religious Entities, but the function of the authorities is to determine that, 
according to the statutes, objective and purpose, the entity is not one of the 
excluded in article 3 § 2 of the Law of Religious Freedom13. 
  
3.2. Essentialist systems. 
 
                                                 
12 F. MESSNER, «Peut-on définir juridiquement la religion? L´exemple de la 
Republique Fédérale d´Allemagne», L´année canonique, vol. 31 (1988), pp. 336-342. In 
a non-official traslation to English, the Court addreesed: «Scientology is a bona fide 
religion and an association that is not only united for ideological purposes but also 
pursues a transcendental purpose.» Superior Court of Hamburg, No. 71 T 79/85, 1988-
FEB-17. 
13 Sentencia del Tribunal Constitucional núm. 46/2001 (Pleno), de 15 febrero, 
Fundamento Jurídico n. 10. Article 3 § 2 of the Law of Religious Freedom Act provides 
that: «Activities, purposes and Entities relating to or engaging in the study of and 
experimentation with psychic or parapsychological phenomena or the dissemination of 
humanistic or spiritualistic values or other similar non-religious aims do not qualify for 
the protection provided in this Act». See Spanish Legislation on Religious Affairs 
(Edited by A. DE LA HERA and R. M. MARTÍNEZ DE CODES) Dirección General de 
Asuntos Religiosos, Ministerio de Justicia, Madrid (1998), p. 42-43.  
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 With this wording we might identify those systems in which the law 
attempts to approach the concept of religion defining religion in its very 
core, as a specific phenomenon in human activity. 
 There are three types of essentialist systems. 
 The first type is etymological. This sub-system looks at the common 
language meaning of religion in a given society. It uses the standard and 
popular definition of religion which always could be found in the 
dictionaries. This etymological system is used by judges, public agents and 
scholars alike. The basic advantage of this etymological approach is its 
close relation with the opinion of the average people of society in a given 
stage of time. The serious inconvenience is that it penalizes the new and 
uncommon religious groups. For instance, many dictionaries include as 
pattern of religion the theistic religions14. The etymological approach has 
been used until very recently by the Dirección General de Asuntos 
Religiosos de España15, which is the entity —inside the Spanish Ministry 
of Justice— in charge of the Registry of Religious Entities, and by some 
Courts of Justice16.   
 The second essentialist system sets the limits of a notion of religion 
differentiating the negative patterns or the positive features. It describes 
several elements essential to religion (positive approach) or it excludes 
phenomena akin to religion (negative approach). From the positive 
viewpoint, this system requires two basic features: divinity and cult17. 
                                                 
14 This is the case of Encyclopedia Britannica (see on-line 
http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9063138/religion) or the case of the Spanish 
Diccionario de la Real Academia Española de la Lengua.   
15 See for instance DGAR, Ress. 22. XII.1992: «En orden a la determinación 
del concepto de lo religioso, es opinión común, recogida en el Diccionario de la Real 
Academia Española de la Lengua, así como en el Diccionario Espasa y en la 
Enciclopedia Larousse, que son elementos integrantes del concepto de lo religioso: a). 
Un conjunto orgánico de dogmas o creencias relativas a la trascendencia, a un Ser 
superior o divinidad.- b). Un conjunto de normas morales que rigen la conducta 
individual y social de los fieles, derivadas del propio dogma.- c). Unos actos de culto, 
concretos y definidos, manifestación externa de la relación de los fieles de una 
confesión religiosa con el Ser Supremo o Divinidad.- d). Como consecuencia de la 
existencia de actos de culto, aunque no sea con el carácter de elemento esencial, la 
tenencia de lugares a los que concurran los fieles para la celebración de dichos actos». 
16 See for instance George v. United States, 196 F.2d 445 (1952) (on 
conscientious objection to military service). 
17  «By religion I mean the worship of God.  On this point you cannot be 
neutral.  Religion is either the worship of a being who is distinct from the worshipers, or 
God is the projection of personal and collective need.  It makes a difference.  The latter 
alternative, the common humanistic interpretation of religious phenomena, affords no 
secure footing for religious freedom.  For my part, I approach this most difficult and 
fundamental of subjects not without diffidence and doubt but with the belief that 
religion is a projection (for who could deny the freight of human desires that every 
religion has borne?), and that religion is also a response to another, an other who is not a 
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Instead, the negative approach excludes those phenomena which seem to be 
parallel or similar to religion. This is the approach followed by the Spanish 
Religious Liberty Law of 1980 in article 3 § 2 which states that: 
«Activities, purposes and Entities relating to or engaging in the study of 
and experimentation with psychic or parapsychological phenomena or the 
dissemination of humanistic or spiritualistic values or other similar non-
religious aims do not qualify for the protection provided in this Act». It 
creates some sort of “negative” definition of religion. 
 And finally, the analogical system analyzes the elements of religion 
in a phenomenological way and elaborates general patterns under which 
any possible social phenomena could be included as religion. In this way, 
and under a non-discriminatory basis, it seems to be clear that in many 
cases some institutionalized humanist movements could be assimilated to 
traditional or well-known religions. This could be the case of the American 
decision Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda18 in which the 
California State Court admitted that tax exemptions for property used for 
religious worship could be extended to a Humanist organization.  
This same style has been followed by the High Court of Australia Church 
of the New Faith v. Commissioner of Pay-roll Tax (Vict.)19, which arrives 
to very different conclusion than that of England in the decision R. v. 
Registrar General, ex p. Segerdal20 which embraces an essentialist stand. 
   
3.3. Nominalist systems 
 
These systems operate with technical concepts of religion, in a way 
that deepens on the findings of the social sciences related to religion. 
  The first approach is the functional approach. It takes the individual 
as reference, not the external and objective phenomenon of religion. The 
basic question for this approach is: “what is the role of religion in human 
life and how does it work?” Being true that it is not possible to have an 
overall notion of all possible religions, this system set aside the objective 
characteristics of religion as a social phenomenon and it explores the 
question of meaning taking as a starting point the experience of well-
known religions. The formulation of this functional approach was stated 
                                                                                                                                               
human being, an other who must have an intelligence and a will and so be, analogously, 
a person.» J. T. NOONAN, «Religious Liberty At Stake», Virginia Law Review, vol. 84 
(1998), p. 460. 
18 Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda, 153 Cal.App.2d 673, 315 P.2d 
394  (1957). 
19 Church of the New Faith v. Commissioner of Pay-roll Tax (Vict.), (1983) 154 
C.L.R. 120. 
20 R. v. Registrar General, ex p. Segerdal, 2 Q.B. 84 (Eng. C.A. 1972). See M. 
RODRÍGUEZ BLANCO, “Los fines religiosos como fines de interés general en el Charity 
Law inglés”, Anuario de Derecho Eclesiástico del Estado, vol. XII (2006), pp. 507-543. 
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many years ago, in the case United States v. Seeger of the Supreme Court 
of the United States: «We believe that under this construction, the test of 
belief ‘in a relation to a Supreme Being’ is whether a given belief that is 
sincere and meaningful occupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel 
to that filled by the orthodox belief in God of one who clearly qualifies for 
the exemption»21. This same path of the functional approach has been 
followed in part by the European Court of Human Rights22, but following a 
two-step process: first, taking into consideration “belief” instead of 
institutionalized religion in those cases which involve individuals and 
second equating belief as views that attain certain level of cogency, 
seriousness, cohesion and importance. 
 The second approach in this nominalist system would follow a 
polythetic approach, taking into account aspects related to religion in a very 
general and abstract way in order to avoid any kind of narrowness in 
evaluating religious belief in the law. I do not know any practical and real 
application of this concept of religion in the law. However, there is an 
important scholarly proposal which follows this style establishing three 
basic criteria: belief, identity and way of life23. 
  
 The polythetic approach needs to integrate in the law process the 
opinion and knowledge of experts on the Sciences of Religion, in order to 
offer a complete account of the different elements that compound the 
complete picture of religion before the law.     
                                                 
21 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 at 165-166, 85 S.Ct. 850, 13 L.Ed.2d 733 
(1965). 
22 See Campbell and Cosans v. U.K., Ser. A, no. 48 (1982), para. 36. M. D. 
EVANS, Religious liberty and international law in Europe, Cambridge University Press 
(1997), pp. 289-293. J. MARTÍNEZ-TORRÓN, “La protección internacional de la libertad 
religiosa”, Tratado de Derecho Eclesiástico, Eunsa, Pamplona (1994), pp. 186-193. 
23 T. JEREMY GUNN, «The Complexity of Religion and the Definition of 
‘Religion’ in International Law», Harvard Human Rights Journal, vol. 16 (2003), pp. 
189-215. Belief includes convictions that people hold regarding God, truth and 
doctrines of faith and stresses the communal dimension of religion. Religion as identity 
emphasizes affiliation with a group, family, ethnicity, race or nationality. Identity 
counterbalances the belief dimension in those aspects in which the individualistic 
dimension of deep feelings, strong conviction, etc. is too much stressed, because in 
many cases that characteristic is not present (i.e. the individual has not deep feelings or 
strong convictions), but the individual feels himself part of a religion. And finally 
religion as way of life underlines the association of religion with actions, rituals, 
customs, and traditions that may distinguish the believer from adherents of other 
religions. Religion generates, in particular, rites, festivals, remarkable places of different 
kinds (either places of worship or holy places), but also, in general, lifestyles, food 
rules, dress codes with different intensity of observance. 
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